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  The population of Texas is expected to double by 2060.  The Texas Lower Rio Grande 
Valley is one area in which alternative water sources and potable treatment methods are being 
sought to support a rapid population growth.  An emerging and promising approach to 
expanding potable water supplies is brackish groundwater desalination.  Due to recent 
technology developments in desalination membranes and increasing prices of surface water 
rights, the economics of desalination have become competitive with conventional treatment 
methods. 
  The seemingly comparable competitive economics relationship between conventional 
and desalination treatments was impacted by Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3, which 
was an attempt to meet the increased demand for municipal water.  This amendment 
established the price at which irrigation water in the Valley can convert to municipal water, as a 
result of urban/residential development of agricultural land, at 68 percent of the market price, 
effective January 1, 2008.  Preliminary economic and financial investigations suggest this 
legislation could affect the adoption of water treatment technology.  This paper identifies and 
analyzes the economic and financial implications, both intended and unintended, of Floor 
Amendment 60 on the Valley water market, and the associated adoption of alternative 
technologies for producing potable water.SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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Introduction to the Problem 
  The population of Texas is expected to double between the years 2000 to 2060 (Texas 
Water Development Board 2006), substantially increasing the demand for potable water.  These 
dynamics prompt stakeholders’ concerns regarding the quantity and quality of future water 
supplies.  The Lower Rio Grande Valley (Valley) of Texas, a four-county region bordering 
Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico, is an area in which alternative sources of water and potable 
treatment methods are being sought to support a rapid population growth (Rogers 2008).   
  The most current popular method for producing potable water in the Valley is the 
conventional treatment of Rio Grande surface water.  The surface water used in the 
conventional treatment process originates from municipal water rights that are delivered by 
irrigation districts (IDs) and water improvement districts (WIDs).   
  One emerging approach to expanding the potable water supplies in the Valley is 
brackish groundwater1 desalination (Norris 2006; Sturdivant et al. 2008).  Critics of desalination 
have previously argued that this method is economically inefficient due to high costs of 
production (e.g., Michaels 2007).  Recent technological developments in Reverse Osmosis2 (RO) 
desalination membranes combined with an increasing price of local water rights have resulted, 
however, in desalination becoming more cost competitive with conventional treatment methods 
(Boyer et al. 2008). 
  The major municipal water suppliers (municipalities) within the Valley are Brownsville, 
Harlingen, and McAllen.  IDs are constitutionally responsible for providing (i.e., delivering) 
water to municipalities. The municipalities are allocated water based on their pre-existing water 
rights and contracts with IDs (Stubbs et al. 2004).  To account for the rapidly-growing municipal 
populations, irrigation water rights can be purchased and converted to municipal water rights.   
Valley Water Issues 
  In early to mid-2005, Valley ID managers considered that the municipal delivery rates 
charged by some individual districts were too low.  The rates were only covering operational 
costs, with the cost of capital replacement and rehabilitation largely ignored.  Conversely, 
municipal managers believed they were paying too much for water delivery because the ID 
infrastructure was pre-existing.  Some municipalities argued they were the largest customer of 
the ID and should therefore have some control over pricing policies/rates.  The overall problem 
                                                 
1 Brackish groundwater is underground “water containing more than 1,000 milligrams per liter (mg/L) of total 
dissolved solids (TDS) and less than 10,000 mg/L TDS” (Texas Water Development Board 2003). 
2 Reverse Osmosis “is the reversal of the natural osmotic process, accomplished by applying pressure in excess of 
the osmotic pressure to the more concentrated solution.  This pressure forces the water through the membrane 
against the natural osmotic gradient, thereby increasingly concentrating the water on one side (i.e., the feed) of the 
membrane and increasing the volume of water with a lower concentration of dissolved solids on the opposite side 
(i.e., the filtrate or permeate).  The required operating pressure varies depending on the TDS of the feed water (i.e., 
osmotic potential), as well as on membrane properties and temperature, and can range from less than 100 psi for 
some NF [Nanofiltration] applications to more than 1,000 psi for seawater desalting using RO” (Environmental 
Protection Agency 2005). SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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was a difference in the perspective of each party regarding the provision of water, without 
consensus agreement as to the underlying value of the associated water rights (Hinojosa 2007). 
  An eight-member Water Rights Task Force committee consisting of ID managers and 
representatives of the municipalities was created in 2005 to address select Valley water issues of 
concern to both IDs and municipalities.  The task force met from June 2005 until coming to an 
agreement during December 2006, which was reviewed and approved by attorneys on each side 
(Hinojosa 2007).  
  Subsequently, additional meetings between the IDs and municipal representatives were 
held.  The result was a written agreement contributing to the language subsequently 
incorporated into an amendment to Senate Bill 3 (SB 3) which appears in Section 49.507 (Texas 
Legislature Online 2007b).  This amendment, Floor Amendment 60 (FA 6), established the price 
at which municipalities can purchase converted irrigation water rights associated with the 
urban/residential development of irrigated agricultural land at 68% of the current market value, 
effective January 1, 2008 (Texas Legislature Online, 2007b).  The 68% value is thought to have 
originated based on actual historical firm yield of the Rio Grande as related to the amount of 
water actually adjudicated (Jarvis 2007).  
 
Background of Legislation 
  Texas Senate Bill 3, the “Water Bill”, was passed in 2007 during the 80th Legislative 
Session.  The evolution and passage of FA 60 was a long process because two competing bills 
that addressed the Valley water issues were traveling through the Texas Legislature 
simultaneously.   
  The goal of the “Abolishment Bill” (House Bill 1271/Senate Bill 975) was to eliminate the 
Hidalgo County Water Improvement District #3 (WID).  This would mean a complete surrender 
of all rights and powers held by the WID to the local municipalities.  Due to specific and careful 
wording, this bill would only affect Hidalgo County WID #3 and the City of McAllen 
(McAllen).  The argument behind this action was that this district was only serving 13 farmers.  
As a consequence, 80% of the district’s water delivery services were being provided to McAllen, 
which accounted for 89% of the revenue earned by Hidalgo County WID #3.  McAllen wanted 
to eliminate the necessity of paying a middleman to deliver their water, and therefore pushed 
for the legislative abolishment of this WID.  Statewide attention was drawn to the abolishment 
bill wherein rights and authority are stripped from an existing ID or WID.  As the 80th 
legislative session evolved, House Bill 1271 was left pending in committee on February 28, 2007, 
and failed to advance in the legislative process.  The companion bill, Senate Bill 975, was passed 
in the Senate on April 19, 2007, but was not placed on the Calendar in the House (Texas 
Legislature Online 2007b).  
  Shortly after House Bill 1271 (the “Abolishment Bill”) was filed in the House, a 
competing bill, the “Conversion Bill” (House Bill 1803/Senate Bill 847), was also filed.  The SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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intention of this bill was to implement the previously mentioned “compromise” that was struck 
by the Water Rights Task Force.  The compromise was to establish a mechanism to ensure a 
water supply for subdivided properties within IDs while keeping IDs whole.3  A municipality 
may petition an ID for the sale of the converted irrigation right associated with the subdivision 
or contract for the use of the water (Hinojosa 2007).  As provided by specific wording in the bill, 
this legislation would only apply to Hidalgo, Cameron, and Willacy Counties in the Valley.  
Similar to House Bill 1271 (the “Abolishment Bill”), House Bill 1803 (the “Conversion Bill”) 
failed to advance to the House floor.  Senate Bill 847 was passed in the Senate on April 19, 2007, 
the same day that the competing Senate Bill 975 was passed.  Senate Bill 847, however, also 
failed to advance on the House side (Texas Legislature Online 2007b). 
  Although both the “Abolishment” and “Conversion” bills stalled in the process, the 
concepts and agreements reflected by the bill language remained in debate.  Language similar 
to House Bill 1803/Senate Bill 847 (the “Conversion Bill”) resurfaced as a floor amendment to SB 
3.  In response, the previous “Abolishment Bill,” Senate Bill 975, was attached as an amendment 
to FA 60.  The outcome was passage of the Conference Committee Report for Senate Bill 3 as 
Floor Amendment 60, without the proposed abolishment component (Texas Legislature Online 
2007b).  
 
Potential Implications of Floor Amendment 60 
  As the Valley population continues to experience extraordinary growth rates, the 
concern of IDs in regards to a “taking” of water rights due to shifts in political strength are more 
acute.  Discussions among the parties in 2005-2006 suggested the possibility of future increases 
in political power for municipalities, thereby decaying the position of IDs.  As a consequence, 
the time (i.e., 2007 80th Texas Legislative Session) was right for compromises, leading to the 
Water Rights Task Force’s agreement and related Senate Bill 847 and House Bill 1803. 
Preliminary Investigations 
  Preliminary economic and financial investigations suggest that the implementation of 
this legislation could impact the competitiveness of desalination of brackish groundwater 
compared to conventional surface water treatment.  The potential effect is a lowering of the 
costs of production for conventional treatment, resulting in a relatively more favored use of 
conventional treatment for producing potable water supplies to the detriment of brackish 
groundwater desalination.  This effect suggests the introduction of a disincentive for the 
adoption of new technology.  The institutionally driven lowering of the costs of conventional 
treatment methods relative to desalination methods is an example of how legislation can 
unintentionally impact local decisions and technology adoption. 
 
                                                 
3 The terms “keeping IDs whole” refers to the ability of IDs to operate at full capacity rather than allowing some 
water resources to sit idle.  Doing so increases economic efficiency of the IDs.  SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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  The objectives of this paper are to examine the potential impacts of legislative decisions 
on the Valley potable water market and to illustrate the economic and financial implications for 
various stakeholders.  Insights are sought in regards to the consequential adoption of 
alternative potable water treatment methods and related welfare impacts on municipalities, 
consumers, and irrigation districts. 
 
Methods 
  In an effort to analyze the potential implications of FA 60 of SB 3 on the Valley potable 
water market and its stakeholders, several interviews with experts were conducted.  These 
interviews began in October 2007 and included legal and water experts and irrigation district 
managers.  In addition, intensive on-line and library research was conducted to obtain 
additional information.  Qualitative economic analyses of the Valley water market were 
conducted and evaluated to investigate and illustrate the perceived or possible effects of the 
legislation on municipalities’ choice between alternative water treatment methods.  Financial 
analyses, including capital budgeting and annuity equivalent analyses, were used to compare 
the financial implications on the life-cycle costs of producing potable water using conventional 
treatment facilities relative to using brackish groundwater desalination facilities.  Conclusions 
were derived regarding the potential effect of such legislation on the adoption of emerging 
technologies for producing potable water.  The economic gains and losses of consumers, 
municipalities, and IDs in the Valley water market were also examined. 
 
Results 
  An evaluation of the effects of FA 60 on the costs of Valley potable water treatment 
options for municipalities, consequences of available water supply, and the overall impacts on 
stakeholders is provided in this section.  Included are applications of game theory, financial 
analyses, isoquants and isocosts, supply and demand, and consumer and producer surplus. 
The Compromise: Game Theory Economics  
  To completely understand the full consequences of the legislation, both intended and 
unintended, it is essential to consider the many ramifications of the amendment.  FA 60 was the 
culminating result of what could be interpreted as “game theory” negotiations between the two 
parties.4  Because of the increasing demand for water by the Valley municipalities that are 
experiencing unprecedented population growth, IDs were concerned that a legislative “taking” 
might be the course of action if they did not compromise with the municipalities.  That is, the 
threat perceived by the IDs was that the water rights could be reallocated legislatively from the 
                                                 
4 Perloff (2004) was used as a reference for the economic theory and concepts that were applied to the research.  
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IDs to municipalities.  The intent of the bill was to ensure a supply of water for the 
municipalities, while keeping a district whole.  Municipalities were guaranteed a path for 
ensuring water supply with clear rules.  The objective of the two parties to create a mechanism 
to keep the region’s collective water rights in the Valley was also established. 
  The goal of both IDs and municipalities was to individually obtain the highest possible 
utility on the price (low for municipalities and high for IDs) of irrigation water converted to a 
municipal right.  A compromise was reached between IDs and municipalities on a price to be 
paid for municipal water rights originating from the conversion of irrigation water associated 
with agricultural land development into urban/residential property on or after January 1, 2008.  
This objective of two agents, each attempting to competitively reach the highest utility for two 
goods, is graphically illustrated in figure 1 as an Edgeworth Box Diagram.  Opportunities exist 
for both agents (IDs and municipalities) to reach higher levels of utility as they negotiate with 
each other and move toward the Contract Curve (CC). 
 
 
Figure 1. Edgeworth Box Diagram for Valley Irrigation Districts and Municipalities 
 
  The goal of Floor Amendment 60 of Texas Senate Bill 3 was to provide a policy that 
would benefit and demonstrate legislators’ responsiveness to the constituents (IDs and 
municipalities) of the affected region.  In the effort to achieve efficiency and consistency, 
however, some inadvertent consequences may have been created.  
Financial Analyses 
  Texas AgriLife Research and Texas AgriLife Extension Service agricultural economists 
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using the two prevalent technologies employed in the Valley: conventional surface water 
treatment (Rogers 2008) and brackish groundwater desalination (Sturdivant et al. 2008).  The 
baseline assumptions embodied in these analyses are those existing prior to the 80th Texas 
Legislature and prior to the passage of SB 3.  Full economic costs are calculated for each type of 
water treatment technology, accounting for initial construction costs, replacement of capital 
components over the total facility’s useful life, annual operating/continuing costs, and the 
requisite investment in water rights.5  Net present value (NPV) analyses and calculation of 
annuity equivalents are employed to determine the life-cycle costs of comparable quality 
potable water production for corresponding operational circumstances in Valley facilities using 
each of the technologies.  The resulting modified life-cycle costs of production cited in Rogers 
(2008) and Sturdivant et al. (2008) are considered suitable for comparison purposes. 
  The McAllen Northwest 8.25 mgd conventional surface-water treatment facility has a 
modified life-cycle cost of producing potable water equal to $667.74/ac-ft ($2.05/1,000 gallons), 
in 2006 dollars (Rogers 2008).  The modified life-cycle cost of producing potable water for the 
Southmost (Brownsville) 7.5 mgd brackish groundwater desalination plant is $615.01/ac-ft 
($1.89/1,000 gallons), in 2006 dollars (Sturdivant et al. 2008).  The inference of these results is 
that prior to January 1, 2008, brackish groundwater desalination economics in the Valley were 
competitive with conventional surface-water treatment economics, even to the extent of a slight 
advantage for the brackish groundwater desalination alternative.  These studies do not propose 
that desalination will replace conventional water treatment, but rather that desalination is an 
economically viable option for increasing potable water supply. 
Financial and Economic Implications Pre-Senate Bill 3 
  Drawing on economic concepts and theories, municipalities’ choice of which potable 
water treatment technology to utilize in meeting increasing water demands in the Valley can be 
characterized using isoquant and isocost graphs.  Considering Valley wide potable water needs, 
a convex isoquant representation (IQ1) is appropriate to illustrate the decreasing substitution 
nature existing among all potable water production situations in the Valley (figure 2).  
Superimposing an isocost line [having a slope of -1.09 (i.e., $667.74/ac-ft for conventional surface 
water treatment /$615.01/ac-ft for brackish groundwater desalination)] on the isoquant in figure 
2 suggests a combination of the two designated technological inputs that can be expected to be 
adopted to meet future expanded potable water demand; i.e., LC1D level of desalination effort 
and LC1C level of conventional water effort are used to meet the total quantity of IQ1. 
                                                 
5 Purchase/ownership of water rights is a requirement only for conventional surface-water treatment facilities.  For 
brackish groundwater desalination facilities, the costs of developing the groundwater well field is a component of 
the initial construction costs.  SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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Figure 2.  Isocost and isoquant of Valley potable water supply, pre-Senate Bill 3 
 
Financial and Economic Implications Post-Senate Bill 3 
  The 68% factor in Section 49.507 of SB 3 reduces the costs of future expansion of potable 
water production from conventional technologies while leaving the costs of brackish 
groundwater desalination unaffected.  That is, the purchase costs of municipal surface water 
rights converted as a result of development after January 1, 2008 are reduced by 32%.  
Incorporation of this institutionally induced cost reduction into the previously noted Rogers et 
al. (2008) analysis of the McAllen Northwest 8.25 mgd conventional surface-water treatment 
facility lowers the current $2,300/ac-ft cost of surface-water rights to $1,564/ac-ft (Rogers 2008).  
Using this adjusted, lower surface-water rights investment along with the other cost data 
identified for the modified analysis results in a revised, “modified” life-cycle cost of producing 
potable water of $609.33/ac-ft ($1.87/1,000 gallons), in 2006 dollars (Rogers 2008). The cited 
legislation has no apparent effect on the costs for producing potable water via brackish 
groundwater desalination (i.e., $615.01/ac-ft or $1.89/1,000 gallons) (Table 1).   
 
Table 1.  Financial Results on the Costs Per Acre-Foot of Water  
  $/Ac-Ft 
Treatment Technology  Before Legislation  After Legislation 
Conventionala  $ 667.74  $ 609.33 
Desalinationb  $ 615.01  $ 615.01 
     
aSource: Rogers (2008).  
bSource: Sturdivant et al. (2008). 
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  The economic consequences of the institutional lowering of the cost of surface water 
rights can be illustrated by adjusting the -1.09 slope of the prior-identified isocost line in figure 
2.  This revised isocost line IC2 with a slope of -.99 (i.e., $609.33/ac-ft for conventional surface 
water treatment/$615.01/ac-ft for brackish groundwater desalination) is illustrated in figure 3.  
The noticeable result is the movement of the least-cost combination of desalination and 
conventional treatment technologies from LC1 to LC2, lowering desalination effort from LC1D to 
LC2D and increasing conventional treated water effort from LC1C to LC2C for IQ1. 
 
Supply and Demand Economics 
  The summation of supply curves for all of the individual firms comprising an industry 
constitute the industry’s supply curve.  The supply curve for brackish groundwater desalination 
is illustrated as SD in Panel A of figure 4.  This is a combination of the potable water supplied by 
brackish groundwater desalination facilities in the Valley.  The supply curve for conventional 
surface water treatment is illustrated in Panel B of figure 4 as SC1.  It represents the supply of 
 
 
Figure 3.  Isocost and isoquant of Valley potable water supply, post-Senate Bill 3 
 
potable water from all conventional surface water treatment plants in the Valley.  For each 
respective firm, its own cost relationships and the associated firm supply curve demonstrate the 
level of production that will occur at each price.  The aggregate supply curve represents the 
respective quantities (Q) of output that will be produced in total by all firms in the industry.  
The aggregate supply curve for potable water created by brackish groundwater desalination 
and conventional surface water treatment is represented in Panel C of figure 4 as SA1.  This is a SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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horizontal summation of the industry supply curves of the two treatment methods in the 
Valley.  
 
Figure 4.  Pre-Senate Bill 3 industry and aggregate supply in Valley water market 
 
  An individual demand curve provides an explanation for a consumer’s purchasing 
behavior for one good over a range of prices.  Generally, the lower the price, the more that an 
individual will purchase.  Or, alternatively, the higher the price, the less an individual will 
purchase.  The summation of individuals’ demand curves for a particular product constitutes 
the industry demand curve for that product.  This phenomenon is similar to the development of 
the aggregate supply curve resulting from summing the individual firms’ supply curves.  
Figure 5 is an extension of figure 4, with the addition of the industry demand curve for potable 
water.  This is illustrated in Panel C of figure 5 as curve DA.  The demand curve in this graph 
represents the amount of potable water desired by all consumers in the Valley at alternative 
prices. 
 
Figure 5.  Pre-Senate Bill 3 industry demand and equilibrium in the Valley water market 
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  The previous discussions of supply and demand relate to the full range of possibilities 
for prices and quantities of a specific product.  At any given time, in a specific location, there is 
generally only one effective price and quantity, referred to as the market equilibrium.  It is 
graphically illustrated as the intersection between an industry supply curve and an industry 
demand curve.  This equilibrium point is illustrated in Panel C of figure 5, in which the potable 
water industry’s demand curve and aggregate supply curve are superimposed on each other in 
the same two-dimensional space.  The market-clearing price and quantity at this point are 
identified in the graph as PA1 and QA1.  The equilibrium point PA1QA1 identifies the market price 
at which the demand for potable water in the Valley by consumers is fulfilled by potable water 
suppliers, which includes brackish groundwater desalination facilities and conventional 
surface-water treatment facilities.   
  The equilibrium price that is determined by the aggregate supply curve and industry 
demand curve is the price received by all suppliers within that market.  Specifically in the case 
of the Valley, PA1 is received by brackish groundwater desalination facilities and conventional 
surface-water treatment facilities.  Panel A in figure 5 illustrates this price, labeled as PD1.  The 
same price, PC1, is received in the conventional treatment market represented in Panel B of 
figure 5.  In response to the price change, QD1 will be supplied by desalination technologies and 
QC1 will be supplied by conventional treatment to provide a total supply of QA1. 
  The previously identified market equilibrium at PA1QA1 will change if an increase or 
decrease in aggregate supply occurs.  Because the legislated 68% price of selected municipal 
water rights identified in FA 60 in Texas SB 3 allows for a reduced cost of production in the 
conventional treatment method, the supply of potable water produced by this method has the 
propensity to increase.  Such a development is graphically illustrated as a rightward, or 
outward, shift in the existing conventional surface-water treatment supply curve, SC1, in Panel B 
of figure 6.  The new supply curve is then represented as SC2.  The aggregate supply curve for 
the potable water industry also increases, as it is a combination of all suppliers within that 
market.  The supply of potable water available at all prices in the Valley effectively shifts to the 
right (SA2), or more water is supplied at a given price as compared to the pre-legislation 
conditions.  The resulting new equilibrium price and quantity are illustrated graphically by the 
intersection of the new aggregate supply curve (SA2) and the industry demand curve (DA) in 
Panel C of figure 6 as PA2QA2.  Notice that the equilibrium quantity increases and the 
equilibrium price decreases.   SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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Figure 6.  Post-Senate Bill 3 market equilibrium in the Valley water market 
 
  The new price for brackish groundwater desalination facilities decreases in Panel A of 
figure 6 to PD2.  The resulting change in quantity is a decrease to QD2.  This represents the most 
extreme case in the potential decreased use of brackish groundwater desalination associated 
with FA 60 of Texas SB 3.  Following the adjusted market equilibrium PA2QA2, the price of 
potable water produced by conventional surface water treatment water also decreases in Panel 
B of figure 6 to PC2.  Due to a shift in the supply of potable water produced by this method, 
however, an increase in the quantity supplied results.  This is shown graphically by an increase 
from QC1 to QC2 in Panel B.  This visual representation of the unintended consequences of 
legislation illustrates the extreme potential impact on future supplies of potable water 
originating from brackish groundwater desalination.  The direction of change (i.e., toward less 
future development of potable water via brackish groundwater desalination) is the point of 
relevance. 
Stakeholder Impacts  
  Prior to January 1, 2008, the industry market equilibrium for potable water can be 
conceptually illustrated in panel C of figure 5, reproduced here as figure 7.  For this equilibrium 
situation, consumer surplus is represented in the area bPA1E1.  The corresponding producer 
surplus is represented by the area PA1aE1.  The potential effects of SB 3 resulting in more potable 
water production and a new industry market equilibrium is illustrated in Panel C of figure 6 
and reproduced here as figure 8.   SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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Figure 7.  Pre-Senate Bill 3 consumer and producer surplus in Valley water market 
 
 
Figure 8.  Post-Senate Bill 3 consumer and producer surplus in Valley water market 
 
  As a consequence of the shift in industry market equilibrium potentially precipitated by 
the legislation, the resulting consumer surplus changes from bPA1E1 to bPA2E2 and producer 
surplus changes from PA1aE1 to PA20E2.  The resulting increase in consumer surplus is illustrated 
as trapezoid PA2PA1E1E2.  This is an advantage to consumers of potable water in the Valley.  Part 
of the original area that represented producer surplus is lost (i.e., PA1PA2xE1), but a new area is 
gained (i.e., axE20).  The area gained can be more, less, or the same as the area lost.  The exact 
measurements of magnitude of effect on the consumers of potable water are unknown, and 
neither the magnitude nor the direction of effect on the producers of potable water are known.  SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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Municipalities with lower costs of production for their potable water supplies are anticipated as 
receiving benefits.   
  Additional critical players in this water issue are IDs that supply water to conventional 
treatment facilities.  In this perspective, the IDs are the producers (i.e., suppliers of the 
municipal water rights) and municipalities are the consumers (i.e., buyers of the municipal 
water rights).  Figure 9 is a representation of FA 60 impacts.  Pre-January 1, 2008, the 
equilibrium point for IDs supply (of municipal water rights converted as a result of 
development) to municipalities was at point b, with price at PID1 and quantity at QID1.  This 
suggests a consumer surplus to municipalities of PID1ab and a producer surplus to IDs of PID1b0.  
If the IDs are expected to maintain QID1 supply of water at the new market price, PID2, the 
producer surplus becomes PID2c0 minus the area of cbf after the implementation of FA 60.  
Simultaneously, consumer surplus post-legislation increases by area PID1PID2fb to become 
PID2fba.  With the lower cost to municipalities resulting in a converted water rights price of PID2, 
consumers (i.e., municipalities) can be expected to increase the water rights they purchase to 
QID2.  This means that consumer surplus would be PID2ae.  Alternatively, IDs producer surplus 
becomes PID2c0 less cde.  This suggests that IDs are selling water rights at less than the cost to 
supply beyond point c.   
 
Figure 9.  Legislative effects on consumer and producer surplus for Irrigation Districts 
 
  Although only a conceptual representation, the above discussion and associated graphs 
illustrate that IDs which are selling water rights converted as a result of development are 
negatively impacted by the legislation.  This is not to say the legislation is undesirable.  It 
evolved between IDs and municipalities, resolving an issue of concern with regard to municipal 
water rights prices.  All discussions with experts occurring during the course of this research SS-AAEA Journal of Agricultural Economics    2008 Articles 
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noted that the potential impact of the legislation on technology adoption was never considered.  
The research presented herein is an illustration of how legislation may cause unexpected 
consequences and impede the adoption of new technology if it is ignored in the process. 
  The consumer and producer surpluses illustrated in this section are a demonstration of 
the potential effects on stakeholders in the short-run.  These surpluses could potentially change 
in the long-run with an increase in potable water demand.  Producers could potentially gain 
more surplus due to an increase in equilibrium price, but theoretically, however, the only 
opportunity for simultaneous realization of maximum producer surplus and maximum 
consumer surplus is in an open competitive market void of any governmental interference.   
 
Conclusions 
  Floor Amendment 60 to Texas Senate Bill 3 is an example of how legislation may have 
unintended consequences that can be illuminated and interpreted by financial and economic 
analyses.  Financial analyses reveal that prior to the implementation of this legislation, the price 
per ac-ft of water each year for brackish groundwater desalination as compared to conventional 
surface water treatment was less costly.  After implementation of the legislation, however, this 
change in price alters the least-cost combination between the use of brackish groundwater 
desalination and conventional surface water treatment, with an apparent advantage toward the 
conventional method.  The decrease in cost of supplying potable water favors an increased 
share in the supply produced by conventional surface water treatment facilities and an increase 
in total supply.  This increase in supply is then transferred to consumers, resulting in a reduced 
equilibrium price and expanded equilibrium quantity.  The change in equilibrium results in an 
increase in consumer surplus for households, but a decrease in producer surplus from the IDs 
perspective.  Therefore, Floor Amendment 60 has overall implications of benefiting consumers 
(i.e., municipalities and people), while adversely affecting some producers (i.e., IDs).   
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